Semantic-Security Capacity for Wiretap Channels of Type II by Goldfeld, Ziv et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
9.
03
61
9v
2 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
7 A
ug
 20
16
1
Semantic-Security Capacity for Wiretap Channels of
Type II
Ziv Goldfeld, Student Member, IEEE, Paul Cuff, Member, IEEE, and Haim H. Permuter, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—The secrecy capacity of the type II wiretap channel
(WTC II) with a noisy main channel is currently an open
problem. Herein its secrecy-capacity is derived and shown to be
equal to its semantic-security (SS) capacity. In this setting, the
legitimate users communicate via a discrete-memoryless (DM)
channel in the presence of an eavesdropper that has perfect access
to a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols, constrained
to a fixed fraction of the blocklength. The secrecy criterion
is achieved simultaneously for all possible eavesdropper subset
choices. The SS criterion demands negligible mutual information
between the message and the eavesdropper’s observations even
when maximized over all message distributions.
A key tool for the achievability proof is a novel and stronger
version of Wyner’s soft covering lemma. Specifically, a random
codebook is shown to achieve the soft-covering phenomenon
with high probability. The probability of failure is doubly-
exponentially small in the blocklength. Since the combined
number of messages and subsets grows only exponentially with
the blocklength, SS for the WTC II is established by using the
union bound and invoking the stronger soft-covering lemma. The
direct proof shows that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity
of the classic WTC with a DM erasure channel (EC) to the
eavesdropper are achievable. The converse follows by establishing
the capacity of this DM wiretap EC as an upper bound for the
WTC II. From a broader perspective, the stronger soft-covering
lemma constitutes a tool for showing the existence of codebooks
that satisfy exponentially many constraints, a beneficial ability
for many other applications in information theoretic security.
Index Terms—Erasure wiretap channel, information theoretic
security, semantic-security, soft-covering lemma, wiretap channel
of type II.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security has adopted the weak-secrecy
and the strong-secrecy metrics as a standard for measuring
security. Respectively, weak-secrecy and strong-secrecy re-
fer to the normalized and unnormalized mutual information
between the secret message and the channel symbol string
observed by the eavesdropper. However, recent work argues
that, from a cryptographic point of view, both these metrics
are insufficient to provide security of applications [1], [2].
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Their main drawback lies in the assumption that the message
is random and uniformly distributed, as real-life messages are
neither (messages may be files, votes or any type of structured
data, often with low entropy). Semantic-security (SS) [3], [4]
is a cryptographic gold standard that was proposed in [2] as an
adequate alternative and shown to be equivalent to a vanishing
unnormalized mutual information for all message distributions.
Adopting SS as our secrecy measure, we establish the SS-
capacity of the wiretap channel of type II (WTC II) with a
noisy main channel, for which even the secrecy-capacity was
an open problem until now. On top of that, the SS-capacity
and the strong-secrecy-capacity are shown to coincide.
Secret communication over noisy channels dates back to
Wyner who introduced the degraded wiretap channel (WTC)
and derived its weak-secrecy-capacity [5]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
extended Wyner’s result to the non-degraded WTC [6], which
is henceforth referred to as the WTC I. A special instance
of the WTC I is when the eavesdropper’s observation is an
outcome of a discrete-memoryless (DM) erasure channel (EC),
which essentially means that he observes a subset of the
transmitted symbols which is chosen at random by nature.
The WTC II was proposed by Ozarow and Wyner [7] as
a generalization of this instance, where a more powerful
eavesdropper selects which subset to observe and security
must hold versus all possible subset choices. Thus, the main
challenge in establishing security for the WTC II boils down
to finding a single sequence of codes that work well for
each of the exponentially many subsets the eavesdropper may
choose. In [7], the authors overcome this difficulty when the
main channel is noiseless by relying on a unique randomized
coset coding scheme in the proof of achievability. The derived
rate-equivocation region was also shown to be tight, which
solved the noiseless main channel scenario. The WTC II with
a general (i.e., possibly noisy) DM main channel, however,
remained an open problem ever since.
A recent endeavor at the optimal secrecy rate of the WTC
II with a noisy main channel was presented in [8] (see also
[9]–[12] for related work). Requiring a vanishing average
error probability and security with respect to the weak-secrecy
metric (namely, while assuming a uniformly distributed mes-
sage and a normalized mutual information), the authors of [8]
extended the coset coding scheme from [7] to obtain an inner
bound on the rate-equivocation region. An outer bound was
also established by assuming that the subset the eavesdropper
chooses to observe is revealed to all parties (i.e., to the
legitimate users). Specializing these bounds to the maximal
equivocation results in an inner and an outer bound on the
weak-secrecy-capacity of a general WTC II; these bounds do
not match.
2In this work, we strengthen both the reliability and the
security criteria, and derive the SS-capacity of the WTC II
with a noisy main channel under a vanishing maximal error
probability requirement. In the heart of the proof stands a
stronger version of the soft-covering lemma which is key for
the security analysis. Wyner’s original soft-covering lemma
[13, Theorem 6.3] is a valuable tool for achievability proofs
of information theoretic security [14]–[17], resolvability [18],
channel synthesis [19], and source coding [20] (see also ref-
erences therein). The result herein sharpens the claim of soft-
covering by moving away from an expected value analysis.
Instead, we show that a random codebook achieves the soft-
covering phenomenon with high probability. The probability
of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength,
enabling more powerful applications through the union bound.
Specifically, the lemma lets one prove the existence of code-
books that satisfy exponentially many secrecy-related con-
straints, which, in turn, resolves the difficulty in the security
analysis for the WTC II.
As a simple preliminary application of the stronger soft-
covering lemma, we derive the SS-capacity of the DM-WTC
I under a maximal error probability requirement. In [21], this
result was established in terms of source universal coding
based on the expurgation technique (e.g., cf. [22, Theorem
7.7.1]) for the broadcast channel with confidential messages
[6], which subsumes the WTC I as a special case. Efficient
code constructions with polynomial complexity that achieve
the SS-capacity under an average error probability constraint
were presented in [2] for the DM scenario and in [23] for the
Gaussian case, while [24] derived the Gaussian SS-capacity
under a maximal error probability constraint. Complexity not
being in the scope of this work, we focus on the funda-
mental limits of semantically-secure communication and give
an alternative proof of the WTC I SS-capacity based on the
stronger soft-covering lemma and classic wiretap codes. Since
the number of secret messages is only exponentially large,
the double-exponential decay the lemma provides ensures SS
with arbitrarily high probability. In other words, even though a
codebook that satisfies exponentially many constraints related
to soft-covering is required, the union bound yields that such
a codebook exists. This code is then amended to be reliable
with respect to the maximal error probability by relying on
the well-known expurgation technique (e.g., cf. [22, Theorem
7.7.1]).
Somewhat surprisingly, our optimal code construction for
the WTC II is just the same. Here, SS involves a vanish-
ing unnormalized mutual information (between the message
and the eavesdropper’s observation), when maximized over
all message distributions and eavesdropper’s subset choices.
However, noting that their combined number grows only
exponentially with the blocklenght, the stronger soft-covering
lemma is still sharp enough to imply that the probability
of an insecure random wiretap code is doubly-exponentially
small. As for the WTC I, reliability is upgraded to account for
maximal error probability using expurgation. The direct proof
shows that any rate up to the weak-secrecy-capacity of the
WTC I with a DM-EC1 to the eavesdropper, is achievable. The
converse follows by showing that the weak-secrecy-capacity
of this WTC I upper bounds the SS-capacity of the WTC II.
An important consequence of the WTC II SS-capacity proof is
that Wyner’s wiretap codes for the erasure WTC I, are optimal.
The binary version of these codes is, in fact, one of the few
examples for which there are explicit constructions of practical
secure encoders and decoders with optimal performance [25],
[26].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
definitions and basic properties. In Section III we state the
stronger soft-covering lemma and provide its proof. Section
IV describes the WTC I and gives an alternative stronger soft-
covering lemma based derivation of its SS-capacity. In Section
V we define the WTC II, state its SS-capacity and prove the
result. Finally, Section VI summarizes the main achievements
and insights of this work.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We use the following notations. Given two real numbers
a, b, we denote by [a : b] the set of integers
{
n ∈ N
∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤
n ≤ ⌊b⌋
}
. We define R+ = {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Calligraphic
letters denote sets, e.g., X , the complement of X is denoted by
X c, while |X | stands for its cardinality. Xn denoted the n-fold
Cartesian product of X . An element of Xn is denoted by xn =
(x1, x2, . . . , xn); whenever the dimension n is clear from the
context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters,
e.g., x. For any S ⊆ [1 : n], we use xS = (xi)i∈S to denote
the substring of xn defined by S, with respect to the natural
ordering of S. For instance, if S = [i : j], where 1 ≤ i < j ≤
n, then xS = (xi, xi+1, . . . , xj).
Let
(
Ω,F ,P
)
be a probability space, where Ω is the sample
space, F is the σ-algebra and P is the probability measure.
Random variables over
(
Ω,F ,P
)
are denoted by uppercase
letters, e.g., X , with similar conventions for random vectors.
The probability of an event A ∈ F is denoted by P(A), while
P(A
∣∣B ) denotes conditional probability of A given B. We
use 1A to denote the indicator function of A. The set of
all probability mass functions (PMFs) on a finite set X is
denoted by P(X ). PMFs are denoted by the capital letter P ,
with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its
possible conditioning. For example, for a discrete probability
space
(
Ω,F ,P
)
and two correlated random variables X and
Y over that space, we use PX , PX,Y and PX|Y to denote,
respectively, the marginal PMF of X , the joint PMF of (X,Y )
and the conditional PMF of X given Y . In particular, PX|Y
represents the stochastic matrix whose elements are given by
PX|Y (x|y) = P
(
X = x|Y = y
)
. We omit subscripts if the
arguments of the PMF are lowercase versions of the random
variables. The support of a PMF P and the expectation of
a random variable X are denoted by supp(P ) and E
[
X
]
,
respectively.
For a discrete measurable space (Ω,F), a PMF Q ∈ P(Ω)
gives rise to a probability measure on (Ω,F), which we
denote by PQ; accordingly, PQ
(
A) =
∑
ω∈AQ(ω), for every
1the erasure probability corresponds to the portion of symbols the eaves-
dropper in the WTC II does not intercept
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A ∈ F . We use EQ to denote an expectation taken with
respect to PQ. For a random variable X , we sometimes
write EX to emphasize that the expectation is taken with
respect to PX . For a sequence of random variable Xn, if the
entries of Xn are drawn in an independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) manner according to PX , then for every
x ∈ Xn we have PXn(x) =
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) and we write
PXn(x) = P
n
X(x). Similarly, if for every (x,y) ∈ Xn × Yn
we have PY n|Xn(y|x) =
∏n
i=1 PY |X(yi|xi), then we write
PY n|Xn(y|x) = P
n
Y |X(y|x). We often use QnX or QnY |X
when referring to an i.i.d. sequence of random variables. The
conditional product PMF QnY |X given a specific sequence
x ∈ Xn is denoted by QnY |X=x.
The empirical PMF νx of a sequence x ∈ Xn is
νx(x) ,
N(x|x)
n
, (1)
where N(x|x) =
∑n
i=1 1{xi=x}. We use T nǫ (PX) to denote
the set of letter-typical sequences of length n with respect to
the PMF PX and the non-negative number ǫ [27, Chapter 3],
i.e., we have
T nǫ (PX) =
{
x ∈ Xn
∣∣∣ ∣∣νx(x)−PX(x)∣∣ ≤ ǫPX(x), ∀x ∈ X}.
(2)
The relative entropy between two probability measures P
and Q on the same σ-algebra F of subsets of the sample space
X , with P ≪ Q (i.e., P is absolutely continuous with respect
to Q) is
D(P ||Q) =
∫
X
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
, (3)
where dPdQ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative between P
and Q. If the sample space X is countable, (3) reduces to
D(P ||Q) =
∑
x∈supp(P )
P (x) log
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)
. (4)
III. THE STRONGER SOFT-COVERING LEMMA
Wyner’s soft-covering lemma [13, Theorem 6.3] states that
the distribution induced by selecting a u-sequence at random
from an appropriately chosen set Cn and passing it through a
memoryless channel QV |U , results in a good approximation
of QnV in the limit of large n, as long as the set is of size
|Bn| = 2nR, where R > I(U ;V ) (Fig. 1). In fact, the set can
be chosen quite carelessly - by random codebook construction,
drawing each sequence independently from the distribution
QnU .
The soft-covering lemmas in the literature use a distance
metric on distributions (commonly total variation or relative
entropy) and claim that the distance between the induced
distribution P (Bn)V and the desired distribution QnV vanishes
in expectation over the random selection of the set2. In
the literature, [18] studies the fundamental limits of soft-
covering as “resolvability”, [28] provides rates of exponential
convergence, [19] improves the exponents and extends the
framework, [29] and [30, Chapter 16] refer to soft-covering
simply as “covering” in the quantum context, [31] refers to
it as a “sampling lemma” and points out that it holds for the
stronger metric of relative entropy, and [32] gives a recent
direct proof of the relative entropy result.
Here we give a stronger claim. With high probability
with respect to the set construction, the distance vanishes
exponentially quickly with the blocklength n. The negligible
probability of the random set not producing this desired result
is doubly-exponentially small.
Let W =
[
1 : 2nR
]
and Bn =
{
U(w)
}
w∈W
be a set of
random vectors that are i.i.d. according to QnU . We refer to Bn
as the random codebook. Let Cn =
{
u(w,Bn)
}
w∈W
denote a
realization of Bn. For every fixed Bn, the induced distribution
is:
P
(Bn)
V (v) = 2
−nR
∑
w∈W
QnV |U
(
v
∣∣u(w,Bn)). (5)
Lemma 1 (Stronger Soft-Covering Lemma) For any QU ,
QV |U , and R > I(U ;V ), where |V| < ∞, there exist
γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n large enough
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (6)
More precisely, for any n ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, R− I(U ;V ))
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) > cδn2−nγδ
)
≤
(
1 + |V|n
)
e−
1
32
nδ
, (7)
where
γδ = sup
α>1
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R− δ − dα(QU,V , QUQV )
)
, (8a)
cδ = 3 log e+ 2γδ log 2 + 2 log
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)
,
(8b)
and dα(Γ,Π) = 1α−1 log2
∫
dΓ
(
dΠ
dΓ
)1−α is the Re´nyi diver-
gence of order α.
Remark 1 The inequality (7) is trivially true for δ outside of
the expressed range.
The important quantity in the lemma above is γδ , which
is the exponent that soft-covering achieves. We see in (7) that
the double-exponential convergence of probability occurs with
exponent δ > 0. Thus, the best soft-covering exponent that the
lemma achieves with confidence, over all δ > 0, is
γ∗ = sup
δ>0
γδ = γ0 = sup
α>1
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R− dα(QU,V , QUQV )
)
.
(9)
The double-exponential confidence rate δ acts as a reduction in
codebook rate R in the definition of γδ . Consequently, γδ = 0
for δ ≥ R − I(U ;V ).
2Many of the theorems only claim existence of a good codebook, but all
of the proofs use expected value to establish existence.
4Remark 2 (Total Variation Exponent of Decay) The
stronger soft-covering lemma can be reproduced while
replacing the relative divergence with total variation [33].
Although, relative entropy can be used to bound total
variation via Pinsker’s inequality, this approach causes a
loss of a factor of 2 in the exponent of decay. Alternatively,
the proof of Lemma 1 can be modified to produce the bound
on the total variation instead of the relative entropy. This
direct method keeps the error exponents the same for the
total variation case as it is for relative entropy.
Before proving Lemma 1, we note that the name ‘stronger
soft-covering lemma’ is justified because (6) implies that
the expectation of the relative entropy over the ensemble of
codebooks decays exponentially fast (i.e., Wyner’s notion of
soft-covering). This is stated in the following lemma and
proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 2 (Stronger than Wyner’s Soft-Covering Lemma)
Let γ1, γ2 > 0 be such that (6) holds for n large enough,
then for every such n,
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) ≤ e−nγ1 + n log
(
1
µV
)
e−e
nγ2
, (10)
where µv = minv∈supp(QV )QV (v) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: We state the proof in terms of
arbitrary distributions (not necessarily discrete). When needed,
we will specialize to the case that V is finite. For any fixed
codebook Cn, let the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the
induced and desired distributions be denoted as
∆Bn(v) ,
dP
(Bn)
V
dQnV
(v). (11)
In the discrete case, this is just a ratio of probability mass
functions. Accordingly, the relative entropy of interest, which
is a function of the codebook Bn, is given by
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) = ∫ dP (Bn)V log∆Bn . (12)
To describe the jointly-typical set over u- and v-sequences,
we first define information density iQU,V , which is a function
on the space U × V specified by
iQU,V (u, v) , log
(
dQV |U=u
dQV
(v)
)
. (13)
In (13), the argument of the logarithm is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative between QV |U=u and QV . Let ǫ ≥ 0 be arbitrary,
to be determined later, and define
Aǫ ,
{
(u,v) ∈ Un×Vn
∣∣∣∣ 1niQnU,V (u,v) < I(U ;V ) + ǫ
}
,
(14)
and note that
iQn
U,V
(u,v) =
n∑
t=1
iQU,V (ut, vt). (15)
We split P (Bn)V into two parts, making use of the indicator
function. For every v ∈ Vn, define
PBn,1(v), 2
−nR
∑
w∈W
QnV |U
(
v
∣∣u(w,Bn))1{(
u(w,Bn),v
)
∈Aǫ
},
(16a)
PBn,2(v), 2
−nR
∑
w∈W
QnV |U
(
v
∣∣u(w,Bn))1{(
u(w,Bn),v
)
/∈Aǫ
}.
(16b)
The measures PBn,1 and PBn,2 on the space Vn are not
probability measures, but PBn,1 + PBn,2 = P
(Bn)
V for each
codebook Bn. We also split ∆Bn into two parts. Namely, for
every v ∈ Vn, we set
∆Bn,1(v) ,
dPBn,1
dQnV
(v) (17a)
∆Bn,2(v) ,
dPBn,2
dQnV
(v). (17b)
With respect to the above definitions, Lemma 3 states an
upper bound on the relative entropy of interest.
Lemma 3 For every fixed codebook Bn, we have
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) ≤ h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 +
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2, (18)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
The proof is relegated to Appendix B. Based on Lemma 3, if
the relative entropy of interest does not decay exponentially
fast, then the same is true for the terms on the right-hand side
(RHS) of (18). Therefore, to establish Lemma 1, its suffices to
show that the probability (with respect to a random codebook)
of the RHS not vanishing exponentially fast to 0 as n → ∞,
is double-exponentially small.
Notice that PBn,1 usually contains almost all of the proba-
bility. That is, for any fixed Bn, we have∫
dPBn,2 = 1−
∫
dPBn,1
=
∑
w∈W
2−nRPQn
V |U
((
u(w,Bn),V
)
/∈ Aǫ
∣∣∣U = u(w,Bn)).
(19)
For a random codebook, (19) becomes∫
dPBn,2
=
∑
w∈W
2−nRPQn
V |U
((
U(w,Bn),V
)
/∈ Aǫ
∣∣∣U = U(w,Bn)).
(20)
The RHS of (20) is an average of exponentially many i.i.d.
random variables bounded between 0 and 1. Furthermore,
the expected value of each one is the exponentially small
probability of correlated sequences being atypical:
EBnPQnV |U
((
U(w,Bn),V
)
/∈ Aǫ
∣∣∣U = U(w,Bn))
= PQn
U,V
((
U,V
)
/∈ Aǫ
)
5= PQn
U,V
(
n∑
t=1
iQU,V (Ut, Vt) ≥ n
(
I(U ;V ) + ǫ
))
(a)
= PQn
U,V
(
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V (Ut,Vt) ≥ 2nλ(I(U ;V )+ǫ)
)
(b)
≤
EQn
U,V
2λ
∑n
t=1 iQU,V (Ut,Vt)
2nλ(I(U ;V )+ǫ)
=
(
EQU,V 2
λiQU,V (U,V )
2λ(I(U ;V )+ǫ)
)n
(c)
= 2
nλ
(
1
λ
log2 EQU,V
[
2
λiQU,V
(U;V )
]
−I(U ;V )−ǫ
)
(d)
= 2nλ
(
dλ+1(QU,V ,QUQV )−I(U ;V )−ǫ
)
, (21)
where (a) is true for any λ ≥ 0, (b) is Markov’s inequality,
(c) follows by restricting λ to be strictly positive, while
(d) is from the definition of the Re´nyi divergence of order
λ+1. We use units of bits for mutual information and Re´nyi
divergence to coincide with the base two expression of rate.
Now, substituting α = λ+ 1 into (21) gives
EBnPQnV |U
((
U(w,Bn),V
)
/∈Aǫ
∣∣∣U = U(w,Bn)) ≤ 2−nβα,ǫ,
(22a)
where
βα,ǫ = (α − 1)
(
I(U ;V ) + ǫ− dα(QU,V , QUQV )
)
, (22b)
for every α > 1 and ǫ ≥ 0, over which we may optimize.
The optimal choice of ǫ is apparent when all bounds of the
proof are considered together (some yet to be derived), but the
formula may seem arbitrary at the moment. Nevertheless, fix
δ ∈
(
0, R− I(U ;V )
)
, as found in the theorem statement, and
set
ǫα,δ =
1
2 (R− δ) + (α− 1)dα(QU,V , QUQV )
1
2 + (α− 1)
− I(U ;V ).
(23)
Substituting into βα,ǫ gives
βα,δ , βα,ǫα,δ =
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R− δ− dα(QU,V , QUQV )
)
. (24)
Observe that ǫα,δ in (23) is nonnegative under the as-
sumption that R − δ > I(U ;V ), because α > 1 and
dα(QU,V , QUQV ) ≥ d1(QU,V , QUQV ) = I(U ;V ).
Next, we use the following version of the Chernoff bound
to bound the probability of (20) not being exponentially small.
Lemma 4 (Chernoff Bound) Let {Xm}Mm=1 be a collection
of i.i.d. random variables with Xm ∈ [0, B] and EXm ≤ µ 6=
0, for all m ∈ [1 :M ]. Then for any c with cµ ∈ [1, 2],
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
≤ e−
Mµ
3B (
c
µ
−1)2 . (25)
The proof is given in Appendix C.
Using (25) with M = 2nR, µ = 2−nβα,δ , B = 1, and cµ =
2, assures that
∫
dPBn,2 is exponentially small with probability
doubly-exponentially close to 1. That is
P
(∫
dPBn,2 ≥ 2 · 2
−nβα,δ
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−βα,δ)
. (26)
Similarly, ∆Bn,1 is an average of exponentially many i.i.d.
and uniformly bounded functions, each one determined by one
sequence in the random codebook:
∆Bn,1(v)
=
∑
w∈W
2−nR
dQnV |U=U(w,Bn)
dQnV
(v)1{(
U(w,Bn),v
)
∈Aǫ
}. (27)
For every term in the average, the indicator function bounds
the value to be between 0 and 2n(I(U ;V )+ǫα,δ). The expected
value of each term with respect to the codebook is bounded
above by one, which is observed by removing the indicator
function. Therefore, the Chernoff bound assures that ∆Bn,1 is
exponentially close to one for every v ∈ Vn. Setting M =
2nR, µ = 1, B = 2n(I(U ;V )+ǫα,δ), and cµ = 1 + 2
−nβα,δ into
(25), gives
P
(
∆Bn,1(v) ≥ 1 + 2
−nβα,δ
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−I(U;V )−ǫα,δ−2βα,δ)
= e−
1
32
nδ
, ∀v ∈ Vn, (28)
which decays doubly-exponentially fast for any δ > 0.
At this point, we specialize to a finite set V . Consequently,
∆Bn,2 is bounded as
∆Bn,2(v) ≤
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)n
, ∀v ∈ Vn, (29)
with probability 1. Notice that the maximum is only over
the support of QV , which makes this bound finite. The
underlying reason for this restriction is that with probability
one a conditional distribution is absolutely continuous with
respect to its associated marginal distribution.
Having (26), (28) and (29), we can now bound the proba-
bility that the RHS of (18) is not exponentially small. Let S
be the set of codebooks Bn, such that all of the following are
true:∫
dPBn,2 < 2 · 2
−nβα,δ , (30a)
∆Bn,1(v) < 1 + 2
−nβα,δ , ∀v ∈ Vn, (30b)
∆Bn,2(v) ≤
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)n
, ∀v ∈ Vn. (30c)
First, we use the union bound, while taking advantage of the
fact that the space Vn is only exponentially large, to show
that the probability of a random codebook not being in S is
double-exponentially small:
P
(
Bn /∈ S
)
(a)
≤ P
(∫
dPBn,2 ≥ 2 · 2
−nβα,δ
)
+
∑
v∈Vn
P
(
∆Bn,1(v) ≥ 1 + 2
−βα,δn
)
+
∑
v∈Vn
P
(
∆Bn,2(v) >
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)n)
(b)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−βα,δ)
+ |V|n · e−
1
32
nδ
(c)
≤ (1 + |V|n) e−
1
32
nδ
, (31)
6where (a) is the union bound, (b) uses (26), (28) and (29),
while (c) follows because βα,δ ≤ 12 (R− δ).
Next, we claim that for every codebook in S, the RHS of
(18) is exponentially small. Let Bn ∈ S and consider the
following. For every x ∈ [0, 1], h(x) ≤ x log ex , using which
(30a) implies that
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
= h
(∫
dPBn,2
)
< 2
(
log e+ βα,δ log 2
)
n2−nβα,δ . (32)
Furthermore, by (30b), we have∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1 <
∫
dPBn,1 log(1 + 2
−nβα,δ)
≤ log(1 + 2−nβα,δ)
(a)
≤ 2−nβα,δ log e, (33)
where (a) follows since log(1+x) ≤ x log e, for every x > 0.
Finally, using (30c) we obtain∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2 ≤
∫
dPBn,2 log
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)n
< 2 log
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)
n2−nβα,δ .
(34)
Combining (32)-(34), yields
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1+
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2
<
(
2
(
log e+ βα,δ log 2
)
+ log e
+ 2 log
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
))
n2−nβα,δ
(a)
= cα,δn2
−nβα,δ (35)
where (a) comes from setting
cα,δ , 3 log e+ 2βα,δ log 2 + 2 log
(
max
v∈supp(QV )
1
QV (v)
)
.
(36)
This implies that for all α > 1 and δ ∈
(
0, R− I(U ;V )
)
,
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) ≥ cα,δn2−nβα,δ
)
≤ P
(
h
(∫
dPBn,1
)
+
∫
dPBn,1 log∆Bn,1
+
∫
dPBn,2 log∆Bn,2 ≥ cα,δn2
−nβα,δ
)
≤ P
(
Bn /∈ S
)
(a)
≤ (1 + |V|n) e−
1
3 2
nδ
, (37)
where (a) follows from (31). Denoting cδ , supα>1 cα,δ, (37)
further gives
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) ≥ cδn2−nβα,δ
)
≤ (1 + |V|n) e−
1
32
nδ
.
(38)
Since (38) is true for all α > 1, it must also be true, with
strict inequality in the LHS, when replacing βα,δ with
γδ , sup
α>1
βα,δ = sup
α>1
α− 1
2α− 1
(
R− δ − dα(QU,V , QUQV )
)
,
(39)
which is the exponential rate of convergence stated in (8a) that
we derive for the strong soft-covering lemma. This establishes
the statement from (7) and proves Lemma 1.
Concluding, if R > I(U ;V ) and for any δ ∈
(
0, R −
I(U ;V )
)
, we get exponential convergence of the relative
entropy at rate O(2−γδn) with doubly-exponential certainty.
Discarding the precise exponents of convergence and coeffi-
cients, we state that there exist γ1, γ2 > 0, such that for n
large enough
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
. (40)
IV. WIRETAP CHANNEL I
As a rather simple application of stronger soft-covering
lemma, we give an alternative derivation of the SS-capacity
of the WTC I [2], [21], [23], [24]. Since the channel to the
legitimate user is the same in both WTCs I and II, the maximal
error probability analysis presented here is subsequently used
to establish reliability for the WTC II.
Our direct proof relies on classic wiretap codes and SS
is established using the union bound while invoking the
stronger soft-covering lemma. In a wiretap code, a subcode
is associated with each confidential message. To transmit a
certain message, a codeword from its subcode is selected
uniformly at random and transmitted over the channel. Letting
these subcodes be large enough while noting that the number
of confidential messages only grows exponentially with the
blocklength, the union bound and the double-exponential de-
cay the lemma provides show the existence of a semantically-
secure sequence of codes. Using these codes, each transmitted
message induces an output PMF at the eavesdropper that
appears i.i.d. and does not depend on the message.
Wyner’s soft-covering lemma, that is now a standard tool
for achieving strong-secrecy for the WTC I, comes up short
in providing SS. The classic soft-covering argument says that
on average over the messages, the output at the eavesdropper
will look i.i.d., provided that the size of these subcodes is large
enough. This can be used to claim that the unnormalized mu-
tual information between the message and the eavesdropper’s
output is small, thus ensuring strong-secrecy. However, for
SS, it must be claimed that the output PMF is close the i.i.d.
distribution for all messages, and there are exponentially many
messages. Here is where the stronger soft-covering lemma is
advantageous.
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Fig. 2. The classic wiretap channel, referred to as the WTC I.
A. Problem Definition
The DM-WTC I is illustrated in Fig. 2. The sender chooses a
message m from the set
[
1 : 2nR
]
and maps it into a sequence
x ∈ Xn (the mapping may be random). The sequence x is
transmitted over the DM-WTC I with transition probability
QY,Z|X . The output sequences y ∈ Yn and z ∈ Zn are
observed by the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
Based on y, the receiver produces an estimate mˆ of m. The
eavesdropper tries to glean whatever it can about the message
from z.
Definition 1 (Code Description) An (n,R) WTC I code Cn
has:
1) A message set M = [1 : 2nR].
2) A stochastic encoder f1 :M→ P(Xn).
3) A decoding function φ1 : Yn → Mˆ, where Mˆ = M∪
{e} and e /∈M.
For any message distribution PM ∈ P(M), the joint PMF
over M×Xn×Yn×Zn×Mˆ induced by PM and an (n,R)
code Cn is:
P (Cn)(m,x,y, z, mˆ) = PM (m)f(x|m)
×QY,Z|X(y, z|x)1{mˆ=φ1(y)}. (41)
Definition 2 (Maximal Error Probability) The maximal er-
ror probability of an (n,R) WTC I code Cn is
e⋆(Cn) = max
m∈M
em(Cn), (42a)
where
em(Cn) =
∑
x∈Xn
f1(x|m)
∑
y∈Yn:
φ1(y) 6=m
QnY |X(y|x). (42b)
Definition 3 (SS Metric) The SS metric associated to an
(n,R) WTC I code Cn is 3
Sem(Cn) = max
PM∈P(M)
ICn(M ;Z), (43)
where ICn denotes a mutual information term that is calculated
with respect to the PMF induced by Cn from (41).
Definition 4 (Semantically-Secure Codes) A sequence of
(n,R) WTC I codes
{
Cn
}
n∈N
is semantically-secure if there
3Sem(Cn) is actually the mutual-information-security (MIS) metric, which
is equivalent to SS by [2]. We use the representation in (43) rather than
the formal definition of SS (see, e.g., [2, Equation (4)]) out of analytical
convenience.
is a constants γ > 0 and an n0 ∈ N, such that for every
n > n0, Sem(Cn) ≤ e−nγ .
Remark 3 SS requires that a single sequence of codes works
well for all message PMFs. Accordingly, the mutual informa-
tion term in (43) is maximized over PM when the code Cn is
known. In other words, although not stated explicitly, PM is
a function of Cn.
Remark 4 By Definition 4, for a sequence of WTC I codes to
be semantically-secure, the SS metric from (43) must vanish
exponentially fast. This is a standard requirement in the
cryptography community, commonly referred to as strong-SS
(see, e.g., [2, Section 3.2]). The coding scheme given in the
direct proof of Theorem 1 achieves this exponential decay of
the SS-metric (see Section IV-C1). An exponential decay of the
strong-secrecy metric was previously observed in [21], [28],
[34].
Definition 5 (SS-Achievability) A rate R ∈ R+ is SS-
achievable if there is a sequence of (n,R) WTC I semantically-
secure codes
{
Cn
}
n∈N
with e⋆(Cn)→ 0 as n→∞.
Definition 6 (SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity of the WTC I,
CSem, is the supremum of the set of SS-achievable rates.
B. Results
As stated in the following theorem, the SS-capacity of
the WTC I under a maximal error probability constraint is
the same as its weak-secrecy-capacity under an average error
probability constraint.
Theorem 1 (WTC I SS-Capacity) The SS-capacity of the
WTC I is
CSem = max
QU,X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
, (44)
and one may restrict the cardinality of V to |U| < |X |.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV-C1. Our
achievability proof relies on the stronger soft-covering lemma
to establish the existence of a sequence of semantically-
secure codes with a vanishing average probability of error.
The expurgation technique [22, Theorem 7.7.1] is then used
to upgrade the codes to have a vanishing maximal error
probability.
Remark 5 The cardinality bound in Theorem 1 was estab-
lished in [35, Theorem 22.1].
Remark 6 The direct part of Theorem 1 can also be derived
without using the stronger soft-covering lemma. Instead, one
may invoke the codebook expurgation technique twice. By
removing a certain portion of the messages, any sequence
of codes that ensures strong-secrecy and a vanishing average
error probability, can be upgraded to provide SS and reliability
with respect to the maximal error probability with negligible
rate-loss. In the original codes, the fraction of messages
8that induce an error probability greater than three times the
average, is less than 13 . Similarly, the fraction of messages
with secrecy distance greater than three times the average is
less than 13 . Therefore, the fraction of offending messages is
less than 23 . By removing them one obtains a new sequence of
codes that is semantically-secure and has a vanishing maximal
error probability. Finally, the rate of the n-th code in the new
sequence is R − log(3)n (here R stands for the rate of the
original codes), and the loss is negligible for large n.
Remark 7 The expurgation method is insufficient for estab-
lishing SS for the WTC II because the messages that need to
be removed might differ from one choice of the eavesdropper’s
observations to the next. It also does not work in other
settings such as the multiple access WTC, where expurgation
is problematic in general. On the other hand, even for that
setting, an achievability proof that relies on the stronger
soft-covering lemma goes through by similar steps to those
presented below. Thus, strong-secrecy can be upgraded to SS
even in situations where vanishing average error probability
cannot be upgraded to vanishing maximum error probability
(via expurgation).
C. Proofs
1) Theorem 1: For the converse, let {Cn}n∈N be a sequence
of (n,R) semantically-secure WTC I codes with e⋆(Cn) →
0. Since both e⋆(Cn) → 0 and Sem(Cn) → 0 hold for any
message distribution PM ∈ P(M), in particular, they hold
for a uniform PM . The converse thus follows since CSem in
(44) coincides with the secrecy-capacity of the WTC I under
a vanishing average error probability criterion and the weak-
secrecy constraint.
For the direct part, we first establish the achievability of (44)
when U = X . Then, a standard channel prefixing argument
extends the proof to any U with U −X − Y .
Fix ǫ > 0, a PMF QX ∈ P(X ), and let M and W
be independent random variables uniformly distributed over
M and W ,
[
1 : 2nR˜
]
, respectively. M represents the
choice of the message, while W stands for the stochastic
part of the encoder. Thus, we start by imposing a uniform
distribution over the set of messages and use this to show the
existence of a semantically-secure sequence of (n,R) codes
with a vanishing average error probability. Afterwards, the
uniform message distribution assumption is dropped using
the expurgation technique [22, Theorem 7.7.1], which allows
upgrading reliability to achieve a vanishing maximal error
probability, while preserving SS.
Codebook Bn: Let Bn be a random codebook
given by a collection of i.i.d. random vectors
Bn =
{
X(m,w)
}
(m,w)∈M×W
, each distributed
according to QnX . A realization of Bn is denoted by
Bn ,
{
x(m,w,Bn)
}
(m,w)∈M×W
, with respect to which a
classic wiretap code is constructed.
Encoder f1: To send m ∈ M the encoder randomly and
uniformly chooses W = w fromW and transmits x(m,w,Bn)
over the WTC I.
Decoder φ1: Upon observing y ∈ Yn, the decoder searches
for a unique pair (mˆ, wˆ) ∈M×W such that(
x(mˆ, wˆ,Bn),y
)
∈ T nǫ (QX,Y ). (45)
If such a unique pair is found, then set φ1(y) = mˆ; otherwise,
φ1(y) = e.
The triple (M, f1, φ1) defined with respect to the codebook
Bn constitutes an (n,R) WTC I code Cn. When a random
codebook Bn is used, we denote the corresponding random
code by Cn.
Average Error Probability Analysis: By standard joint
typicality arguments we show that the average error probabil-
ity, when expected over the ensemble of codebooks, is arbitrar-
ily small. For every fixed codebook Bn and (m˜, w˜) ∈M×W ,
define the event
E(m˜, w˜,Bn) =
{(
x(m˜, w˜,Bn),Y
)
∈ T nǫ (QX,Y )
}
, (46)
where Y ∼ QnY |X=x(m˜,w˜,Bn) is the random sequence ob-
served at the receiver when the transmitted sends (m˜, w˜). We
have
ECn
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
em(Cn)
= ECnPCn
(
Mˆ 6= M
)
≤ ECnPCn
(
(Mˆ, Wˆ ) 6= (M,W )
)
(a)
= ECnPCn
(
(Mˆ, Wˆ ) 6= (1, 1)
∣∣M = 1,W = 1)
(b)
= EBnP

E(1, 1,Bn)c ∪

 ⋃
(m˜,w˜) 6=(1,1)
E(m˜, w˜,Bn)


∣∣∣∣∣∣Bn


(c)
≤ PQn
X,Y
(
(X,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QX,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
+
∑
(m˜,w˜) 6=(1,1)
PQn
X
×Qn
Y
(
(X,Y) ∈ T nǫ (QX,Y )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
,
(47)
where (a) uses the symmetry of the codebook construction
with respect to m and w, (b) follows by the decoding rule,
while (c) takes the expectation over the ensemble of codebooks
and uses the union bound.
By the law of large numbers P1 → 0 as n → ∞, while
P2 → 0 as n grows provided that4
R+ R˜ < I(X ;Y ). (48)
Thus, we have
ECn
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
em(Cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. (49)
Security Analysis: For any fixed Bn (which, in turn, fixed
Cn), we denote by P (Cn)M,Z the joint distribution of M and Z
4All subsequent mutual information terms in the proof are calculated with
respect to QU,XQY,Z|X or its marginals.
9induced by the code Cn (see (41)). For any Bn, we first have
max
PM∈P(M)
ICn(M ;Z)
(a)
= max
PM∈P(M)
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Cn)Z ∣∣∣PM)
(b)
≤ max
PM∈P(M)
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ∣∣∣PM)
= max
PM∈P(M)
∑
m∈M
P (m)D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ)
≤ max
PM∈P(M)
∑
m∈M
P (m) max
m˜∈M
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ)
= max
m∈M
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ), (50)
where (a) uses the relative entropy chain rule, while is because
for any PM ∈ P(M), we have
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Cn)Z ∣∣∣PM)
=
∑
m∈M
P (m)
∑
z∈Zn
P (Cn)(z|m) log
(
P (Cn)(z|m)
P (Cn)(z
) · QnZ(z)
QnZ(z)
)
= D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ∣∣∣PM)
−
∑
m∈M
P (m)
∑
z∈Zn
P (Cn)(z|m) log
(
P (Cn)(z)
QnZ(z)
)
= D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ∣∣∣PM)−D(P (Cn)Z ∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ)
≤ D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ∣∣∣PM). (51)
Now, let γ˜ be an arbitrary positive real number to be
determined later and consider the following probability.
P
({
Sem(Cn) ≤ e
−nγ˜
}c)
(a)
≤ P
({
max
m∈M
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) ≤ e−nγ˜}c
)
= P
({
∀m ∈M, D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) ≤ e−nγ˜}c
)
= P
(
∃m ∈ M, D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) > e−nγ˜
)
= P
( ⋃
m∈M
{
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) > e−nγ˜}
)
≤
∑
m∈M
P
(
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) > e−nγ˜
)
, (52)
where (a) follows from (50) and (50).
By the stronger soft-covering lemma, if
R˜ > I(X ;Z), (53)
then there are γ1, γ2 > such that
P
(
D
(
P
(Cn)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnZ) > e−nγ1
)
≤ e−e
nγ2
, (54)
for sufficiently large n. Inserting (54) into (52) while setting
γ˜ = γ1, we have
P
({
Sem(Cn) ≤ e
−nγ1
}c)
≤
∑
m∈M
e−e
nγ2
= 2nR · e−e
nγ2
, ηn −−−−→
n→∞
0, (55)
and therefore,
P
(
Sem(Cn) ≤ e
−nγ1
)
≥ 1− ηn −−−−→
n→∞
1. (56)
Inequality (56) implies that if R˜ satisfies (53), the probability
that a randomly generated sequence of codes meets the SS
criterion for large n is arbitrarily close to 1. In fact, because
(55) decays so rapidly, the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies
that almost every sequence of realizations of
{
Cn
}
n∈N
is
semantically-secure.
SS-Achievability: To establish the existence of a sequence
of (n, 2nR) reliable and semantically-secure codes
{
Cn
}
n∈N
,
we reproduce the Selection Lemma [36, Lemma 2.2].
Lemma 5 (Selection Lemma) Let {An}n∈N be a sequence
of random variables, where An takes values in An. Let{
f
(1)
n , f
(2)
n , . . . , f
(I)
n
}
n∈N
be a collection of I <∞ sequences
of bounded functions f (i)n : An → R+, i ∈ [1 : I]. If
Ef (i)n (An) −−−−→
n→∞
0, ∀i ∈ [1 : I], (57a)
then there exists a sequence {an}n∈N, where an ∈ An for
every n ∈ N, such that
f (i)n (an) −−−−→n→∞
0, ∀i ∈ [1 : I]. (57b)
For completeness, the proof of Lemma 5 is given in
Appendix D. Applying Lemma 5 to the random vari-
ables
{
Cn
}
n∈N
and the functions 1|M|
∑
m∈M em(Cn) and
1{
Sem(Cn)>e−nγ1
}
, while using (49) and (55), we have that
there is a sequence of (n,R) WTC I codes
{
Cn
}
n∈N
, for
which
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
em(Cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (58a)
1{
Sem(Cn)>e−nγ1
} −−−−→
n→∞
0. (58b)
Since the indicator function in (58b) takes only the values 0
and 1, to satisfy the convergence there must exist an n0 ∈ N,
such that
1{
Sem(Cn)>e−nγ1
} = 0, ∀n > n0, (59)
and therefore,
Sem(Cn) ≤ e
−nγ1 , ∀n > n0. (60)
The final step is to amend
{
Cn
}
n∈N
to be reliable with
respect to the maximal error probability (as defined in (42a)).
This is done using the expurgation technique (see, e.g., [22,
Theorem 7.7.1]). Namely, we discard the worst half of the
codewords in each codebook Bn. Denoting the amended
sequence of codebooks by
{
B⋆n
}
n∈N
and their corresponding
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sequence of codes by
{
C⋆n
}
n∈N
, we have
e⋆(C⋆n) −−−−→n→∞
0. (61)
Note that in each C⋆n there are 2nR−1 codewords, i.e., throwing
out half the codewords has changed the rate from R to R −
1
n , which is negligible for large n. Further note that because{
Cn
}
n∈N
is semantically-secure, so is
{
C⋆n
}
n∈N
. Combining
(48) with (53), we have that every
0 ≤ R < max
QX
[
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)
]
(62)
is SS-achievable.
To establish the achievability of CSem from (44), we prefix
a DM-channel (DMC) QX|V to the original WTC I QY,Z|X
to obtain a new channel QY,Z|V , where
QnY,Z|V (y, z|v) =
∑
x∈Xn
QnX|V (x|v)Q
n
Y,Z|X(y, z|x). (63)
Using a similar analysis as above with respect to QY,Z|V , any
R ∈ R+ satisfying
R < max
QU,X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
(64)
is achievable.
V. WIRETAP CHANNEL II
The WTC II scenario considers communication between
two legitimate parties in the presence of an eavesdropper that
can choose to observed any subset of the transmitted sequence,
while being limited in quantity. The challenge in this setting is
that the eavesdropper knows the codebook when it selects the
subset to observe. Therefore, secrecy will only be achieved
if it is achieved uniformly for all selections of packets, of
which there are exponentially many possibilities. Furthermore,
SS being our goal, secrecy must be ensured for each one of
the exponentially many confidential messages. Nonetheless,
as the combined number of subsets and messages grows only
exponentially with the blocklenght, using the stronger soft-
covering lemma we show that rates all the way up to the weak-
secrecy-capacity of the DM erasure WTC I are achievable even
in this more stringent setting. Then, we establish the capacity
of this WTC I as an upper bound on the considered WTC II,
thus characterizing its SS-capacity.
A. Problem Definition
The WTC II is illustrated in Fig. 3. The sender chooses a
message m from the set
[
1 : 2nR
]
and maps it into a sequence
x ∈ Xn (the mapping may be random). The sequence x is
transmitted over a point-to-point DMC with transition proba-
bility QY |X . Based on the received channel output sequence
y ∈ Yn, the receiver produces an estimate mˆ of m. The
eavesdropper noiselessly observes a subset of its choice of
the n transmitted symbols. Namely, the eavesdropped chooses
S ⊆ [1 : n], |S| = µ ≤ n, and observes z ∈
(
X ∪ {?}
)n
,
where
zi =
{
xi , i ∈ S
?, i /∈ S
. (65)
PSfrag replacements
m
Trans.
S ⊆ [1 :n], |S|=µ
Zi=
{
Xi , i ∈ S
?, i /∈ S
X
QY |X
Y
Z
Rec.
Eave.
mˆ
m
Fig. 3. The type II wiretap channel.
Based on z, the eavesdropper tries to learn as much as possible
about the message.
With some abuse of notation (reusing notations from Section
IV-A), we introduce the following definitions. An (n,R) WTC
II code Cn and the corresponding maximal error probability
e⋆(Cn) are defined similarly to Definitions 1 and 2, respec-
tively.
Definition 7 (SS Metric) The SS metric with respect to an
(n,R) WTC II code Cn is
Semµ(Cn) = max
PM∈P(M),
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
ICn(M ;Z), (66)
where ICn denotes that the mutual information term is calcu-
lated with respect to
P
(Cn,S)
M,Z (m, z)=P (m)
∑
x∈Xn
f(x|m)1{
zi=xi, i∈S
}
∩
{
zi=?, i/∈S
}.
Remark 8 As explained in Remark 3, the code Cn is known
when the mutual information term in (66) is maximized. Thus,
the observed subset S ⊆ [1 : n] and the message PMF PM are
both functions of Cn. Although, for the sake of simplicity, this
dependence is omitted from our notations, the reader should
keep in mind that a single codebook is required to works well
for all choices of subsets and message PMFs.
Definition 8 (Semantically-Secure Codes) Let α ∈ [0, 1]
and µ = ⌊αn⌋, a sequence of (n,R) WTC II codes {Cn}n∈N
is α-semantically-secure if there is a constants γ > 0 and an
n0 ∈ N, such that for every n > n0, Semµ(Cn) ≤ e−nγ .
Definition 9 (SS-Achievability) Let α ∈ [0, 1] and µ =
⌊αn⌋, a rate R ∈ R+ is α-SS-achievable if there is a sequence
of (n,R) α-semantically-secure WTC II codes {Cn}n∈N with
e⋆(Cn)→ 0 as n→∞.
Definition 10 (SS-Capacity) For any α ∈ [0, 1], the α-SS-
capacity of the WTC II CSem(α) is the supremum of the set
of α-SS-achievable rates.
B. Converse
The following proposition is subsequently used for the
converse proof of the WTC II SS-capacity. The proposition
states that the strong-secrecy-capacity of a WTC I with a
DM-EC to the eavesdropper is an upper bound on the strong-
secrecy-capacity of the WTC II. To formulate the result,
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slight modifications of some of the definitions from Sections
IV-A and V-A are required. Specifically, we redefine the
achievable rates for each setting with respect to a strong-
secrecy requirement (instead of SS).
Definition 11 (Strong-Secrecy Achievability for WTC I)
A rate R ∈ R+ is strong-secrecy-achievable for the WTC I if
there is a sequence of (n,R) codes {C1,n}n∈N with
e⋆
(
C1,n
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0 (67a)
IC1,n
(
M ;Z
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0, (67b)
where M is uniformly distributed over the message set M.
Definition 12 (Strong-Secrecy Achievability for WTC II)
Let α ∈ [0, 1] and µ = ⌊αn⌋, a rate R ∈ R+ is α-strong-
secrecy-achievable for the WTC II if there is a sequence of
(n,R) codes
{
C2,n
}
n∈N
with
e⋆
(
C2,n
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0 (68a)
max
S⊆[1:n]:
|S|=µ
IC2,n
(
M ;Z
)
−−−−→
n→∞
0, (68b)
where M is uniformly distributed over the message set M.
The strong-secrecy-capacity for both setting is defined as
the supremum of the set of strong-secrecy-achievable rates.
Proposition 1 (WTC I Upper Bounds WTC II) Let α ∈
(0, 1] and CIIS (α) be the α-strong-secrecy-capacity of the WTC
II with a main channel Q(2)Y |X . Furthermore, let β ∈ [0, α)
and CIS(β) be the strong-secrecy-capacity of the WTC I with
transition probability Q(1)Y,Z|X = Q
(2)
Y |XE
(β)
Z|X , where E
(β)
Z|X is a
DM-EC with erasure probability β¯ = 1− β, i.e.,
E
(β)
Z|X(z|x) =
{
β, z = x
β¯, z =?
, ∀x ∈ X . (69)
Then
CIIS (α) ≤ C
I
S(β) = max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− βI(U ;X)
]
. (70)
See Section V-C1 for the proof. Proposition 1 is subse-
quently combined with the following lemma to to establish
the converse for the α-SS-capacity of the WTC II.
Lemma 6 (Continuity of WTC I Capacity) As a function
of β,
CIS(β) = max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− βI(U ;X)
]
(71)
is continues inside (0, 1).
The proof of Lemma 6 is relegated to Appendix E. The SS-
capacity of the WTC II with a noisy main channel is stated
next.
Theorem 2 (WTC II SS-Capacity) For any α ∈ [0, 1],
CSem(α) = max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− αI(U ;X)
]
, (72)
and one may restrict the cardinality of U to |U| < |X |.
The converse and direct parts of Theorem 2 are established
in Sections V-C2 and V-C3, respectively. As oppose to the SS-
capacity of the WTC I (where achievability may be derived
without using Lemma 1 - see Remark 6), for the WTC II, the
stronger soft-covering lemma is essential for the direct proof.
Specifically, via the union bound, the double-exponential de-
cay that Lemma 1 provides is leveraged to show the existence
of a sequence of codes that satisfies the vanishing information
leakage requirement for all choices of S and PM .
Remark 9 (Generalized WTC II SS-Capacity) The proof
of Theorem 2 is robust and readily extends to a more general
setting where the eavesdropper’s observed symbols are cor-
rupted by random noise. Specifically, we refer to the scenario
where the eavesdropper first chooses a subset of indices
S ⊆ [1 : n] of size µ = ⌊αn⌋, then xS is passed through
a DMC QZ|X and the eavesdropper receives Zi ∼ QZ|X=xi ,
for i ∈ S, and Z =? otherwise. The α-SS-capacity for this
case is
C
(Noisy)
Sem (α) = max
QU,X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
[
I(U ;Y )− αI(U ;Z)
]
, (73)
and recovers (72) by setting Z = X . Both the direct and the
converse proofs of (73) follow by a verbatim repetition of the
arguments from Section V-C, with two minor changes. First for
the converse, the classic DM-EC from Proposition 1 (proven
in V-C1) is replaced with a cascade of the DM-EC and the
DMC QZ|X . Second, for the SS analysis in the direct proof
(Section V-C3) we replace the rate bound from (110) with
R˜ > αI(U ;Z) (the reliability analysis goes through without
changes).
Remark 10 The cardinality bound in Theorem 2 is estab-
lished using the convex cover method [35, Appendix C]. The
details are omitted.
Remark 11 Theorem 2 recovers the achievability result from
[8, Equation (7)] by setting U = X and taking X to be
uniformly distributed over X . Furthermore, in [8] secrecy was
established while assuming a uniform distribution over the
message set, i.e., on average over the messages. Although we
require security with respect to a stricter metric (SS versus
weak-secrecy), we achieve higher rates than [8, Equation (7)]
and show their optimality. Moreover, to achieve (72), we use
classic wiretap codes and establish SS using the stronger soft-
covering lemma, making the (rather convoluted) coset coding
scheme from [8] (inspired by [7]) no longer required.
C. Proofs
12
1) Proposition 1: The equality in (70) follows by evaluating
the strong-secrecy-capacity formula of a general WTC I, i.e.,
max
QU,X :
U−X−(Y,Z)
[
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
]
, (74)
for the case where the transition probability matrix is
Q
(1)
Y,Z|X = Q
(2)
Y |XE
(β)
Z|X . Let Φ ∼ Ber(β) be a random variable,
such that its i.i.d. samples define the erasure process of
the DM-EC with erasure probability β¯. Accordingly, Φ is
independent of X and
Z =
{
X, Φ = 0
?, Φ = 1
. (75)
First note that Φ is determined by Z since ? /∈ X .
Combining this with the Markov relation U − X − (Y, Z)
implies that the chain U − X − (Y, Z,Φ) is also Markov.
Along with the independence of X and Φ, this implies that
U and Φ are also independent. Consequently, for every QU,X ,
where U −X − (Y, Z) forms a Markov chain, we have
I(U ;Z)
(a)
= I(U ; Φ, Z)
(b)
= I(U ;Z|Φ)
(c)
= βI(U ;X) + β¯I(U ; ?)
= βI(U ;X), (76)
where (a) follows since Φ is defined by Z , while (b) and (c)
follows by the independence of Φ and U . Since (76) holds for
every QU,X as above, we conclude that
CIS(β) = max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− βI(U ;X)
]
. (77)
To prove the inequality in (70), we show that for any α ∈
(0, 1] and β ∈ [0, α), an α-strong-secrecy-achievable rate for
the WTC II is also achievable for the WTC I with erasure
probability β¯.
Fix α, β as above and let R ∈ R+ be an α-strong-secrecy-
achievable rate for the WTC II. Furthermore, let
{
C2,n
}
n∈N
be the corresponding sequence of (n,R) codes satisfying (68).
Since the channel to the legitimate receiver and the definition
of the maximal error probability are the same for both versions
of the WTC (see (67a) and (68a)), {C2,n}n∈N is also reliable
when using it to transmit over the WTC I. Therefore, to
establish (70), it suffices to show that for every ǫ > 0, there
is an n⋆ ∈ N, such that for every n > n⋆
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
)
≤ ǫ, (78)
where Z1 denoted the channel output sequences observed by
the eavesdroppers of the WTC I. In other words, we show that
the sequence of codes
{
C2,n
}
n∈N
, designed to achieve strong-
secrecy for the WTC II, also achieves strong-secrecy for the
WTC I.
Let Z2 be the channel output observed by the eavesdroppers
of the WTC II, fix ǫ > 0 and let n0 ∈ N be such that for every
n > n0,
max
S⊆[1:n]:
|S|=µ
IC2,n
(
M ;Z2
)
≤
ǫ
2
. (79)
For every z ∈ Zn, where Z , X ∪ {?}, define
A(z) ,
{
i ∈ [1 : n]
∣∣zi =?}, (80)
and let Θ(Z) be
Θ(Z) , 1{
|A(Z)|≤⌈α¯n⌉
}. (81)
Namely, Θ indicates if the number of erasures in a sequence
z ∈ Zn is greater than or equal to ⌈α¯n⌉ or not.
By conditioning the mutual information term from (78) on
Θ(Z1), we distinguish between the two cases of Z1 being
better or worse than Z2 in terms of the number of erased
symbols. When Θ(Z1) = 0, i.e., Z1 is worse that Z2, security
for the WTC I is ensured since
{
C2,n
}
n∈N
achieve security for
the WTC II. Otherwise, for the case that Θ(Z1) = 1, where
Z1 is better than Z2, we use Sanov’s Theorem to show that the
probability of such an event exponentially decreases with the
blocklength n, while the mutual information grows linearly at
most. For any n ∈ N, we have
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
) (a)
= IC2,n
(
M ; Θ
(
Z1
)
,Z1
)
(b)
= IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
∣∣∣Θ(Z1))
= P
(
Θ
(
Z1
)
=0
)
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
∣∣∣Θ(Z1)=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I0
+ P
(
Θ
(
Z1
)
=1
)
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
∣∣∣Θ(Z1)=1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
,
(82)
where (a) is because Θ(Z1) is a function of Z1, while (b)
follows since the number of erasures in the output sequence
of a DM-EC is defined by an i.i.d. process that is independent
of the message.
For I0, taking any n > n0, (79) implies that
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
∣∣∣Θ(Z1) = 0) ≤ max
S⊆[1:n]:
|S|=µ
IC2,n
(
M ;Z2
)
≤
ǫ
2
.
(83)
To upper bound I1, first note that
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
∣∣∣Θ(Z1) = 1) ≤ n log (|X |+ 1), (84)
holds for every n ∈ N. Now, fix any δ ∈ (β, α); there exists
an n1(δ) ∈ N, such that for all n > n1
⌈α¯n⌉ ≤ δ¯n < β¯n. (85)
Thus, for every n > n1(δ) Sanov’s Theorem [22, Theorem
11.4.1] implies
P
(
Θ
(
Z1
)
=1
)
≤ P
(∣∣A(Z1)∣∣ ≤ δ¯n) ≤ (n+1)2 · 2−nDb(δ,β),
(86)
where Db(δ, β) = α log (δ/β) + δ¯ log (δ¯/β¯) is the relative
entropy between the PMFs of two binary random variables
distributed according to Ber(δ) and Ber(β), respectively. Since
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δ 6= β, we have that Db(δ, β) > 0, and therefore, there is an
n1(δ) < n2 ∈ N, such that for every n > n2,
I2 ≤ (n+ 1)
2 · 2−nDb(δ,β) · n log
(
|X |+ 1
)
≤
ǫ
2
. (87)
Set n⋆ = max{n0, n2}. Based on (83) and (87), for every
n > n⋆, we have
IC2,n
(
M ;Z1
)
= I0 + I1 ≤ ǫ, (88)
which completes the proof.
2) Theorem 2 - Converse: For the converse, we first show
that with respect to the notations used in Proposition 1,
CIIS (α) ≤ C
I
S(α) = max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− αI(U ;X)
]
, (89)
for any α ∈ [0, 1]. For α = 0, 1, the relation is straightforward
as
CIS(0) = max
QX
I(X ;Y ) = CIIS (0) (90a)
CIS(1) = 0 = C
II
S (1). (90b)
For α ∈ (0, 1), (89) is established by relying on Proposition
1 and the continuity argument from Lemma 6. Namely, by
taking the limit of (70) as β ↑ α establishes (89).
Having this, the converse follows by arguments similar to
those presented in Section IV-C1. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] and let
R ∈ R+ be an α-SS-achievable rate for the WTC II and{
Cn
}
n∈N
be its corresponding (n,R) sequence of codes. By
the definitions in (42a) and (66), {Cn}n∈N are reliable and
α-semantically-secure for every message distribution, and in
particular, for a uniform message distribution. This implies
CSem(α) ≤ C
II
S (α) ≤ max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− αI(U ;X)
]
(91)
and completes the converse proof.
Remark 12 Our converse proof relies on the achievability
being defined in terms of a limit as n → ∞ (see Definition
9). Namely, we show that in the limit, the eavesdropper in
the WTC I setting is likely to be within a slightly higher
channel-observation budget than this of the WTC II, which
by continuity won’t result in much extra rate. The chance of
having too many channel observations is too small to provide
non-negligible extra information. If, however, the blocklength
n can be chosen as a design parameter, then it may be possible
that a finite n results in a higher achievable secrecy-rate. For
instance, notice that the optimal code of length 2n in not
necessarily better than the optimal code of length n, since
when the blocklenght is longer the eavesdropper has more
flexibility in choosing his observations.
3) Theorem 2 - Direct Part: As before, we start by showing
the achievability of (72) when U = X . After doing so, we use
channel prefixing to extend the proof to any U with U−X−Y .
Fix α ∈ [0, 1], ǫ > 0 and a PMF QX on X . Letting M
and W be independent random variables uniformly distributed
over M and W = [1 : 2nR˜], respectively, we repeat the code
construction from Section IV-C1. A similar analysis of the
average error probability shows that if
R+ R˜ < I(X ;Y ), (92)
then
EBn
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
em(Cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (93)
where Cn is the random code that corresponds to the random
codebook Bn.
Security Analysis: Fix S ⊆ [1 : n] with |S| = µ = ⌊αn⌋,
recall that Z , X ∪{?} and define the following PMF on Zn,
Γ
(S)
Z (z) =
∏
j∈Sc
1{
zj=?
} ∏
j∈S
IZ(zj), ∀z ∈ Z
n, (94)
where IZ is the average output PMF of the identity DMC on
X , i.e.,
IZ(z) =
∑
x∈X
QX(x)1{z=x} =
{
QX(z), z ∈ X
0, z =?
. (95)
For any Cn (defined by fixing Bn) and PM ∈ P(M), the
relative entropy chain rule implies
ICn(M ;Z) = D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Cn,S)Z ∣∣∣PM)
= D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z ∣∣∣PM)
−D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z ∣∣∣PM) , (96)
and therefore
max
PM∈P(M)
ICn(M ;Z)
≤ max
PM∈P(M)
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z ∣∣∣PM)
≤ max
PM∈P(M)
∑
m∈M
P (m) max
m˜∈M
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M=m˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z )
= max
m∈M
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z ) . (97)
For any ∅ 6= A ⊆ [1 : n] and z ∈ Zn, recall that zA ,
(zi)i∈A is the sub-vector of z indexed by the elements of A.
The relative entropy chain rule further simplifies the RHS of
(97) as follows. For any m ∈M, we have
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)Z ) = D (P (Cn,S)ZS ,ZSc |M=m∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)ZS ,ZSc)
= D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)
ZS
)
+D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS
c |M=m,ZS
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)
ZS
c
∣∣∣P (Cn,S)ZS |M=m)
(a)
= D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(S)ZS )
(b)
= D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) , (98)
where (a) is because P (Cn,S)
ZS
c |M=m,ZS=zS
= 1{
Zi=?, i∈Sc
} =
Γ
(S)
ZS
c , for every zS ∈ Z |S|, and (b) follows from (94).
Combining (96)-(98), we have that for every Cn and S ⊆
[1 : n], with |S| = µ = ⌊αn⌋,
max
PM∈P(M)
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Cn,S)Z ∣∣∣PM)
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≤ max
m∈M
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) .
(99)
In particular, (99) also holds when maximizing over the substes
S, which gives
Semµ(Cn) ≤ max
m∈M,
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) . (100)
Having (100), let δ˜ be an arbitrary positive real number to
be determined later and consider the following probability.
P
({
Semµ(Cn) ≤ e
−nδ˜
}c)
= P
(
max
PM∈P(M),
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
Z|M
∣∣∣∣∣∣P (Cn,S)Z ∣∣∣PM) > e−nδ˜
)
(a)
≤ P

 max
m∈M,
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) > e−nδ˜


= P

 ⋃
m∈M,
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
{
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) > e−nδ˜
}
(b)
≤
∑
m∈M,
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
P
(
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) > e−nδ˜
)
, (101)
where (a) uses (100), and (b) is the union bound.
Each term in the sum on the RHS of (101) falls into the
framework of the stronger soft-covering lemma, with respect
to a blocklength of µ and the identity channel. Noting that
|W| = 2nR˜ = 2µ
nR˜
µ , we have that as long as
nR˜
µ
> H(X), (102)
there exist δ1, δ2 > 0 that for sufficiently large n satisfy
P
(
D
(
P
(Cn,S)
ZS |M=m
∣∣∣∣∣∣IµZ) > e−nδ1
)
≤ e−e
nδ2
. (103)
Since µ = ⌊αn⌋ ≤ αn, taking
R˜ > αH(X), (104)
is sufficient to satisfy (102) for every n ∈ N.
Setting δ˜ = δ1 and plugging (103) into (101), gives
P
({
Semµ(Cn) ≤ e
−nδ1
}c)
≤
∑
m∈M,
S⊆[1:n]: |S|=µ
e−e
nδ2
≤ 2n · 2nR · e−e
nδ2
, κn −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Invoking Lemma 5 once more, we have that if (92) and
(102) are satisfied, then there is a sequence of (n,R) α-
semantically-secure codes
{
Cn
}
n∈N
, with
ECn
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
em(Cn) −−−−→
n→∞
0. (105)
The pruning argument from Section IV-C1 again upgrades{
Cn
}
n∈N
to be reliable with respect to the maximal error
probability. Combining (92) and (102) shows the achievability
of
R < max
QX
[
I(X ;Y )− αH(X)
]
. (106)
Finally, we prefix a DMC QX|U to the original WTC II to
obtain a new main channel QY |U , given by
QnY |U (y|u) =
∑
x∈Xn
QnX|U (x|u)Q
n
Y |X(y|x). (107)
Furthermore, Γ(S)Z from (94) is redefined as
Γ
(S)
Z (z) =
∏
j∈Sc
1{
zj=?
} ∏
j∈S
QZ(zj), ∀z ∈ Z
n, (108)
where QZ is given by
QZ(z) =
∑
(u,x)∈U×X
QU (u)QX|U (x|u)1{z=x}
=
{∑
u∈V QU (u)QX|U (z|u), z ∈ X
0, z =?
.
Repeating a similar analysis as above shows that reliability is
achieved if
R+ R˜ < I(U ;Y ), (109)
while the rate needed for the stronger soft-covering lemma is
R˜ > αI(U ;X). (110)
Putting (109)-(110) together yields that any rate R ∈ R+
satisfying
R < max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− αI(U ;X)
]
, (111)
is strongly α-SS-achievable and concludes the proof.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We derived the SS capacity of the WTC II with a noisy
main channel. The SS metric ensures that the unnormalized
mutual information between the message and the eavesdrop-
per’s observation is arbitrarily small, even when maximized
over all message distributions and all possible choices of
the eavesdropper’s observation. The main tool used in the
direct proof is a novel and stronger version of Wyner’s soft
covering lemma, that states that a random codebook achieves
the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability as long
as its rate is higher than the mutual information between the
input and output of the DMC. Furthermore, the probability of
failure is doubly-exponentially small in the blocklength, thus
making the lemma advantageous in proving the existence of
codebooks that satisfy exponentially many constraints. A code
that achieves SS for the considered WTC II should do just that.
The SS capacity was achieved by using classic Wyner’s
wiretap codes. Since the combined number of messages and
subsets grows only exponentially with the blocklength, SS
was established by applying the union bound and invoking
the stronger soft-covering lemma. The direct proof showed
that rates up to the weak-secrecy capacity of the WTC I with
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a DM-EC to the eavesdropper are achievable. The converse
followed by showing that the capacity of this WTC I is an
upper bound on the SS capacity of the WTC II.
As a preliminary and simple application of the stronger soft-
covering lemma, it was used to achieve SS for the WTC I.
A main goal in doing so was to emphasize the advantage
of this approach over other methods for achieving SS for
this scenario, such as the expurgation technique. While the
expurgation method fails to generalize to some multiuser
settings, such as the multiple access WTC, an achievability
proof that relies on the stronger soft-covering lemma goes
through by similar steps to those presented here. Thus making
the stronger soft-covering lemma a tool by which the common
weak-secrecy and strong-secrecy results can be upgraded to
SS. Furthermore, the lemma might prove useful in any other
scenario in which performance is measures with respect to an
exponential number of constraints.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Mohamed Nafea and Aylin
Yener for a helpful discussion of the problem.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let n0 ∈ N be such that (6) holds for any n > n0. For
these values of n we have
EBnD
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV )
= ECn
[
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV )
(
1{
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣QnV )≤e−nγ1}
+ 1{
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣QnV )>e−nγ1}
)]
(a)
≤ e−nγ1 + n log
(
1
µV
)
P
(
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) > e−nγ1)
(b)
≤ e−nγ1 + n log
(
1
µV
)
e−e
nγ2
, (112)
where (a) follows because for every fixed Bn
D
(
P
(Bn)
V
∣∣∣∣∣∣QnV ) = ∑
z∈Zn
P (Bn)(z) log
(
P (Bn)(v)
QnV (v)
)
≤ n log
(
1
µV
)
,
and µv = minv∈supp(QV )QV (v), while (b) follows from (6).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Fix a codebook Cn and define
Θ = 1{(
U(W,Bn),V
)
/∈Aǫ
} + 1. (113)
Note that for θ = 1, 2, we have
P
(Bn)
Θ (θ) =
∫
dP
(Bn)
V
∑
w∈W
2−nRQnV |U=u(w,Bn)
×
[
1{
θ=1
}
∩
{(
u(w,Bn),V
)
∈Aǫ
}
+ 1{
θ=2
}
∩
{(
u(w,Bn),V
)
/∈Aǫ
}]
=
∫
dPBn,θ, (114)
and consequently, for every measurable A ⊆ Vn,
P
P
(Bn)
V,Θ
(
V ∈ A,Θ = θ
)
= PPBn,θ
(
V ∈ A
)
=
∫
A
dPBn,θ. (115)
For simplicity of notation, denote P (Bn)V , P , PBn,1 , P1,
PBn,2 , P2, Q
n
V , Q and P
(Bn)
Θ , ΓΘ, and consider
D(P ||Q) =
∫
dP log
(
dP
dQ
)
(a)
=
∫
dQ
dP
dQ
log
(
dP
dQ
)
(b)
=
∫
dQEΓΘ
[
1
ΓΘ(Θ)
·
dPΘ
dQ
]
× log
(
EΓΘ
[
1
ΓΘ(Θ)
·
dPΘ
dQ
])
(c)
≤
∫
dQEΓΘ
[
1
ΓΘ(Θ)
·
dPΘ
dQ
·
× log
(
1
ΓΘ(Θ)
·
dPΘ
dQ
)]
=
∑
θ=1,2
ΓΘ(θ)
∫
dQ
1
ΓΘ(θ)
·
dPθ
dQ
× log
(
1
ΓΘ(θ)
·
dPθ
dQ
)
(d)
=
∑
θ=1,2
log
(
1
ΓΘ(θ)
)∫
dPθ
+
∑
θ=1,2
∫
dPθ log
(
dPθ
dQ
)
(e)
= h
(∫
dP1
)
+
∑
θ=1,2
∫
dPθ log∆Bn,θ, (116)
where:
(a) follows since for any two measures µ, λ with µ ≪ λ and
a µ−integrable function g, we have∫
gdµ =
∫
g
dµ
dλ
dλ; (117)
(b) follows from (115) and the law of total probability;
(c) follows by applying Jensens inequality to the convex
function x 7→ x log(x);
(d) follows by the properties of the logarithm and (117);
(e) follows from (114) and the definition of ∆Bn,θ , for
θ = 1, 2, in (17).
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE CHENOFF BOUND - LEMMA 4
Let X have the same distribution as X1. For any λ > 0,
we have
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
(a)
≤
Eeλ
∑M
m=1Xm
eλcM
=
(
EeλX
eλc
)M
(b)
≤
(
1 + e
λB−1
B EX
eλc
)M
≤
(
1 + e
λB−1
B µ
eλc
)M
(c)
≤
(
e
eλB−1
B
µ
eλc
)M
= e
−M
(
λc+ µ
B
−µe
λB
B
)
, (118)
where (a) is the Chernoff bound, (b) uses the fact that eλx ≤
1 + e
λB−1
B x, for x ∈ [0, B] due to convexity, and (c) uses
1 + x ≤ ex.
Optimizing the RHS of (118) over λ given λ⋆ = 1B ln cµ
as the minimizer, as long as cµ ≥ 1. Plugging this into (118)
yields
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
≤ e
−Mµ
B
(
c
µ (ln
c
µ
−1)+1
)
, ∀
c
µ
≥ 1.
(119)
This is a good bound when µ ≪ B, as it is in our case. If
c/µ is shrinking, then to further simplify the bound consider
the third order Tayler expansion of x(ln x− 1) about x = 1,
x(lnx− 1) + 1 ≥
1
2
(x− 1)2 −
1
6
(x− 1)3, ∀x ≥ 1. (120)
The LHS in (120) is a lower bound because the fourth
derivative is positive for all x ≥ 1. Furthermore, if x− 1 ≤ 1,
we have
1
2
(x− 1)2 −
1
6
(x− 1)3 ≥
1
3
(x − 1)2, ∀x ∈ [1, 2]. (121)
Putting it all together gives
P
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Xm ≥ c
)
≤ e−
Mµ
3B (
c
µ
−1)2 , ∀
c
µ
∈ [1, 2].
(122)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Since
{
f
(i)
n
}
n∈N
, i ∈ [1 : I], are bounded and by (57a),
there exists a sequence {δn}n∈N such that
Ef (i)n (An) ≤ δn, ∀i ∈ [1 : I], n ∈ N, (123)
and δn → 0 as n→∞. We have
P
( I⋃
i=1
{
f (i)n (An) ≥ (I+1)δn
})
≤
I∑
i=1
P
(
f (i)n (An) ≥ (I + 1)δn
)
(a)
≤
I∑
i=1
Ef
(i)
n (An)
(I + 1)δn
(b)
≤
I
(I + 1)
< 1. (124)
Therefore, there exists a realization {an}n∈N of
{
An
}
n∈N
such that
f (i)n (an) < (I + 1)δn , δ˜n, ∀i ∈ [1 : I], n ∈ N. (125)
Since I <∞ independently of n, we have δ˜n → 0 as n→∞.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We prove the continuity of CIS(β) inside (0, 1) by showing
that it is bounded and convex. Let β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ [0, 1]
and observe that
CIS(λβ1 + λ¯β2)
= max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
(λ+ λ¯)I(U ;Y )− (λβ1 + λ¯β2)I(U ;X)
]
≤ λ max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− β1I(U ;X)
]
+ λ¯ max
QU,X :
U−X−Y
[
I(U ;Y )− β2I(U ;X)
]
= λCIS(β1) + λ¯C
I
S(β2). (126)
Furthermore, for every β ∈ (0, 1),
CIS(β) ≤ max
QX
I(X ;Y ) ≤ log |Y| <∞. (127)
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